

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1-HUM)
DATE 07-28-2015
C32W33B91

F B I

Date: 12/1/72

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (65-35851)
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-118121) (C)
SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET TRAWLERS
IS-R

Re NY airtel 10/30/72.

5-Bureau (RM)
(1-65-63234) (METHODS OF DETECTING SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS)
(1-105-216642) (GOLDEINCH)
(1-105-87025) [REDACTED] (S)

2-Anchorage (RM)
2-Baltimore (RM)
2-Boston (RM)
2-Charlotte (RM)
2-Columbia (RM)
2-Honolulu (RM)
2-Houston (RM)
2-Jacksonville (RM)
2-Los Angeles (RM)
2-Miami (RM)
2-Mobile (RM)
2-Newark (RM)
2-New Haven (RM)
2-New Orleans (RM)
2-Norfolk (RM)
2-Philadelphia (RM)
2-Portland (RM)
2-Richmond (RM)
2-San Antonio (RM)
1-New York
(COPIES CONT'D)

RFM:ms
(62)

105-216642 -
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167 DEC 12 1972

CARBON COPY

Approved: [Signature]
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

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NY 105-118121

Reference is made to NY airtel to the Bureau and interested offices concerning the information analyzed and set forth by NY as well as information prepared at the direction of the Bureau in the LHM accompanying this airtel.

For the information of interested offices, the LHM should not be disseminated outside the Bureau and that any information brought to the attention of interested offices should be furnished to Bureau Headquarters.

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2-Savannah (RM)
2-Seattle (RM)
2-Tampa (RM)
2-Washington Field (RM)
1-New York (65-17812) (METHODS OF DETECTING SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS)
1-New York (105-115626) (GOLDFINCH)

[REDACTED] (S)

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ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-218638)

11/13/72

SAC, NEW YORK (65-25702) (P*)

UNSUB;
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KGB In The United States
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(OO:NY)

ReNYlet to Director, 2/14/72, and Bureau routing
slip dated 5/10/72.

In view of the very limited identifying information
furnished by [] re captioned Unsub, efforts to identify
him have been unproductive.

New York Office is awaiting response from []
[] and requests that Bureau attempt to determine if
any additional information has been developed, particularly by
[] which can assist in initiating active investigation
of this matter..

The NYO has placed this case in a pending inactive
status.

Oleg A^o Lyalin

- 3 - Bureau (RM)
- (1 - 105-216642) (LYALIN)
- 1 - New York (105-115626) (LYALIN)
- 1 - New York

MMG/rdm
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (65-35851) DATE: OCT 30 1972

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-118121) (P)

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET TRAWLERS
IS-R

ReBulet to NY, 9/1/72, with enclosures.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM. Two copies of enclosed LHM are being furnished coastal offices and those offices possibly having an interest in this matter.

- 5 - Bureau (Encls. 8) (RM)
(1 - 65-63234) (METHODS OF DETECTING SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS)
(1 - 105-216642) (GOLDFINCH)
(1 - 105-87025) [REDACTED] (S)
- 2 - Anchorage (Encls. 2) (AMRM)
 - 2 - Baltimore (Encls. 2) (RM)
 - 2 - Boston (Encls. 2) (RM)
 - 2 - Charlotte (Encls. 2) (RM)
 - 2 - Columbia (Encls. 2) (RM)
 - 2 - Honolulu (Encls. 2) (AMRM)
 - 2 - Houston (Encls. 2) (AMRM)
 - 2 - Jacksonville (Encls. 2) (RM)
 - 2 - Los Angeles (Encls. 2) (AMRM)
 - 2 - Miami (Encls. 2) (RM)
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 - 2 - New Haven (Encls. 2) (RM)
 - 2 - New Orleans (Encls. 2) (RM)
 - 2 - Norfolk (Encls. 2) (RM)
 - 2 - Philadelphia (Encls. 2) (RM)
 - 2 - Portland (Encls. 2) (AMRM)
 - 2 - Richmond (Encls. 2) (RM)
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 - 2 - Savannah (Encls. 2) (RM)
 - 2 - Seattle (Encls. 2) (AMRM)
 - 2 - Tampa (Encls. 2) (RM)
 - 2 - Washington Field (Encls. 2) (RM)
 - 1 - New York (65-17812) (METHODS OF DETECTING SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS)
 - 1 - New York (105-115626) (GOLDFINCH)
 - 1 - [REDACTED] (S)
 - 1 - New York [REDACTED]

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ENCLOSURE

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NY 105-118121

(S) Enclosed LHM is being classified "~~Secret~~" because it contains information furnished by [redacted] a most sensitive and valuable source, disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

b1
b3

NY T-1 is [redacted] (S)

NY T-2 is GOLDFINCH.

For the information of offices receiving copies of this communication, the Bureau has advised that the [redacted]

b7D
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[redacted] The Bureau has advised that [redacted]

[redacted]
the US and, therefore, also US territories.

As is evident from the facts set forth in enclosed LHM, it would be incumbent upon all offices receiving copies of this communication to alert and maintain liaison with the US Coast Guard which has primary jurisdiction in determining [redacted]

b7D

This jurisdiction comes under the US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, a division of Enforcement and Surveillance.

The Special Agent of the NYO in contact with US Customs Agency and US Coast Guard in New York is SA [redacted]

b6
b7C

Any information coming to the attention of these offices in connection with the activities of Soviet trawlers in this regard should be brought to the attention of the Bureau and the NYO as the illegal activities, to the Bureau's knowledge, has been mainly directed by the New York Residency; however, in coordination of these facts a copy should be furnished to WFO.

NY 105-118121

Any further information obtained from either of the two above-mentioned sources will be brought to the attention of interested offices.

The NYO continues to maintain liaison with US Coast Guard in this matter.

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

January 11, 1973

RE: GOLDFINCH

Reference is made to your memorandum dated December 28, 1972, your PF 884.

For your information [redacted]

[redacted]
Byelorussian Delegation to the 26th Session of the United Nations General Assembly which was held between October 10, 1971, and December 16, 1971.

1 - London

Delivered to Washington Representative of [redacted] on 1-12-73

1 - [redacted] CONTROL FILE)

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

JPL:aeh (7)

NOTE: Goldfinch is the British code name for information furnished by Oleg Lyalin, KGB officer who defected in England in 1971. We had furnished to the British a list of Soviet officials in the U.S. in 9/71 for display to Lyalin. One of the names included was [redacted]. The British advised that they were unable to find his name on any of the check lists and asked for further information concerning him. [redacted] entered the U.S. in 9/71 to attend a session of the UN General Assembly.

This is classified "~~SECRET~~" since it refers to information concerning a KGB defector, the disclosure of which could cause serious damage to the national security.

~~SECRET~~

55 JAN 24 1973

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UNCLAS

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ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-218638)

FEB 7 1973

SAC, NEW YORK (65-25702)

UNSUB;
Armenian Operated By 13th Department
KGB in the US
IS-R
(OO:NY)

ReNYlet to Director, 2/14/72, and 11/13/72,
and San Francisco, SPIA letter dated 12/11/72.

For the information of San Francisco,
captioned case is based on information received
from OLEG LYALIN (Soviet Defector) describing an
Agent of the KGB 13th Department (now referred to
as Department V). The information concerning the
Unsub is as follows:

An American who is now an American citizen
living in the US. He left Armenia many years ago but
still has relatives in Russia. He writes to his
relatives; not to officials, and uses an ancient
Armenian language which is difficult to translate
as it is not spoken today.

(S) Page 4 of referenced San Francisco SPIA
letter mentions [redacted]

[redacted] Foreign Resources
Division, [redacted] in San Francisco, who has had
numerous and extensive contacts with various Soviet
officials, exchange students, visiting Soviet groups,
etc., for a number of years. [redacted] is described
as being a naturalized US citizen of Armenian
descent who has a number of relatives including a
brother and his mother currently residing in Soviet
Armenia.

(S) 3 - Bureau (RM)
(105-216642) (LYALIN)
2 - San Francisco (RM)
1 - New York (105-115626) (LYALIN)
1 - New York
KMG:kay
(7)

~~NOT RECORDED~~

192 FEB 12 1973

58 FEB 15 1973

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NY 65-25702

The San Francisco Office is asked to consider the possibility that these individuals could be identical.

(S) There are some obvious similarities between the Unsub and [redacted] as regards country of origin, present citizenship and relatives residing in Russia.

The apparent open association with Soviet officials on the part of [redacted] as evidenced by his visiting the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., last November for the October Revolution festivities would necessarily diminish the probability [redacted]

[redacted]

(S) The NYO suggests the possibility that [redacted] may have been utilized at some previous time by the [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) If either of the above is true it would lend credence to our initial consideration that the Unsub and [redacted] are identical and that the direction of the Unsub has been diverted to other channels of activity.

The NYO realizes that this is only a remote possibility, however, no logical suspects have been developed and no additional information except the sketchy initial description of the Unsub has been received from LYALIN.

San Francisco is requested to conduct appropriate inquiry of local [redacted] representatives to resolve this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642)

DATE: FEB 14 1973

FROM : *JEM/jab* SAC, NEW YORK (105-115626)

SUBJECT: *0* OLEG A. LYALIN
IS-R

ReNYlet, 11/20/72.

Enclosed herewith are five copies of an LHM captioned "SOVIET STATE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMMITTEE (GNTK)/GOLDFINCH" dated as above.

The enclosed LHM is classified "~~Secret~~" as inquiry made by was so classified and the unauthorized disclosure of the information contained therein could reasonably be expected to result in serious damage to the national security.

The enclosed LHM is prepared for dissemination to only in response to their inquiry of 12/7/72.

Any additional information which comes to the attention of the NYO in this matter will be submitted for dissemination to

- 2cc. W. - 48. INFO 2/14/73 JF. 6-20*
- 3 - Bureau (Encls. 5) (RM)
(1-Legat, London)
1 - New York

JB:kap
(4)

REC-77

EX-101

4 FEB 16 1973

ESPIONAGE

DOC. OF 105-216642-110



~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~Soviet State Scientific and
Technical Committee (GNTK)/Goldfinch~~

Reference is made to your memorandum No. 0867
dated December 7, 1972, and our communication dated
November 20, 1972.

As stated in our communication of November 20,
1972, there is no direct evidence of a GNTK role
being played in the current negotiations leading to
a general trade agreement between the Soviet Union and
the United States. We stated the [redacted]

[redacted] have always utilized the Soviet Trading
Agency in the United States, the Amtorg Trading
Corporation in New York City, to provide cover
positions for [redacted] KGB and GRU officers and agents
of the Scientific and Technical Directorates of the
[redacted] It is these individuals who are involved in
negotiations with American business firms for the
purchase of technology and equipment.

We therefore have no examples to offer
of KGB or GRU officers operating under GNTK
cover at this time.

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY ARNOLD E. BRANDT

EX-100


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INDEFINITE

100-210642-110

SUBJECT:
CHARACTER:
BUFILE:
NYFILE:
WFOFILE:



MAR 6 1973

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CLG A. CYALIN

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [REDACTED] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE
PAST". IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE SET
FOORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

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IN THE EVENT ATTACHED INFORMATION IS TO BE
DISSEMINATED FURTHER, EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE UTILIZED
IN REPORTING THE MANNER IN WHICH INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED
BY [REDACTED]

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CLASSIFICATION:

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Bureau advised on 2/15/73 of the receipt
of the following information: [REDACTED]

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	Bureau	New York	WFO
② -	GOLDFINCH	105-216642	1 - 105-155626
2 -	[REDACTED]	1 - 105-18797	1 - 105-9811
2 -	[REDACTED]	1 - 65-14635	b6
		SUB L	b7C
			b7D

DOWNGRADED TO

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Per ADG/JAN/14/75 2

Date 4/4/2014

NOT REGRADED

170 MAR 13 1973

1 MAR 15 1973

[REDACTED]

It has recently been reported that the Russian initials G.N.T.K. refer to the Soviet State Committee on Science and Technology. The KGB places many of its KGB officers within this committee within the Soviet Union in covert positions. In this manner, these individuals travel abroad ostensibly as bona fide scientific Soviet representatives of this committee while in effect they are basically interested in gathering information of value to KGB. It is indicated that GRU may also do likewise.

It was further learned relative to the above, that outside the Soviet Union, KGB deploys various KGB officers under the guise of Scientific Counsellors representing the Soviet Union's State Committee on Science and Technology.

As an example of the application of this technique would be the case of [REDACTED] Scientific Counsellor within the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., while in effect, [REDACTED] Chief of "Line X" within the WDC KGB Residence.

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